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ALICE: (Exasperated, pointing after RICH) While you talk, he's gone!
MORE: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he
broke the law!
ROPER: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law
to get after the Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
* John S. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, The University of
Alabama School of Law. This Essay was delivered as the John S. Stone Chair Inaugural Lecture, on
March 12, 2009, at The University of Alabama School of Law. I should note that I had the privilege of
serving as a law clerk to Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. from July 1991 to September 1992; my clerkship
with Judge Johnson was an incomparable professional experience that has informed much of my work
going forward. Any errors or omissions in this Essay are my responsibility alone.
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MORE: (Roused and excited) Oh? (Advances on ROPER) And when
the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-where
would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? (He leaves him)
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's
laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the
man to do it-d'you really think you could stand upright in the
winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil
benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.'
INTRODUCTION
First, I wish to thank Dean Ken Randall and the faculty of The Univer-
sity of Alabama School of Law for inviting me to become a part of this
outstanding academic community. In candor, I do not think any other law
school in the nation has achieved so much, in such a short period of time,
as has The University of Alabama School of Law. By any reasonable met-
ric, including the quality and productivity of its faculty, its students, its
staff and administration, or if measured by the scope and depth of its
alumni's contribution to the state, the nation, and the world, The Univer-
sity of Alabama School of Law has achieved a remarkable level of success,
success that has brought the School of Law well-deserved national, and
international, attention. It is an exciting place to be, and I am both pleased
and honored to be a member of this intellectual community.
My topic this afternoon is the rule of law.2 Perhaps more than any
other topic, the rule of law captures our collective imaginations; what
greater virtue can a lawyer possess, one might ask, above a serious and
thorough commitment to the rule of law? However easy it may be to extol
the virtues and importance of the rule of law in contexts that are largely
1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONs 66 (1960).
2. By "rule of law," I mean the notion that a judicial body has an obligation to decide cases
appearing before it without regard to the identities of the litigants and to apply the controlling rules
without regard to whether doing so produces a congenial outcome from the decider's point of view.
The great Chief Justice John Marshall made this point very nicely when he famously noted that "[t]he
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). As Professor Teemu Ruskola has explained:
Although there is much debate over just what the rule of law means, there is a resounding
consensus about what it is not: it is not the "rule of men." Indeed, the idea that the rule of
law means precisely not the rule of men is so fundamental that the two terms are best under-
stood as forming a singular expression-"rule of law, and not of men"-even when the
clarifying phrase "and not of men" is not tagged to the end.
Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.
J. 655, 659 (2003); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 209-15 (1986) (discussing the consti-
tutive elements of the rule of law and the importance of these conditions to a just and well-ordered
society); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 783-92 (1989)
(discussing various iterations and elements of the rule of law and positing that the precise contours of
the concept are both contestable and, in fact, contested).
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hortatory, honoring the concept in contexts where it matters most can
prove to be considerably more difficult. Lawyers have a particular obliga-
tion to help secure the rule of law, and this obligation extends beyond law
school commencement speeches-and inaugural chair lectures. A meaning-
ful commitment to the rule of law means, to use Robert Bolt's wonderful
metaphor, a willingness to give the devil himself the benefit of law;3 in the
aftermath of 9/11, it is all too easy to forget this.4
In thinking about the obligation of lawyers to work to secure the rule
of law, and in considering the cost of suiting deed to word, the example of
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., a hero of the Civil Rights Movement and a
storied graduate of this institution, provides an instructive example.5 Judge
Johnson's lived commitment to securing the rule of law is instructive not
only because of his willingness and ability to pursue justice, regardless of
the personal consequences to himself or his family,' but because it demon-
strates that a commitment to the rule of law is most emphatically not a
commitment to reaching results that consistently favor one litigant or group
of litigants. It is easy to follow the dictates of the law when it requires us
to do things with which we agree, and believe to be good, but what about
those times when law and personal morality (or loyalty) tread nonparallel
paths? Only in the context of those harder cases can one truly test whether
a professed commitment to the rule of law constitutes a meaningful com-
mitment or, rather, pretty, but largely empty, verbiage.
3. BOLT, supra note 1, at 66.
4. In this context, one should note that even Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., in advocating nonviolent
resistance to unjust laws, recognized and accepted that a community dedicated to the rule of law could
not suspend punishment for intentional violations of law:
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law as the rabid segregationist would do.
This would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly (not
hatefully as the white mothers did in New Orleans when they were seen on television
screaming, "nigger, nigger, nigger"), and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit
that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts
the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is
in reality expressing the very highest respect for law.
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), reprinted in MARTIN LUTHER KING
JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 83, 90 (James Melvin
Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter King, Letter from a Birmingham Jail]. In this sense, then, Dr. King
plainly and unequivocally embraced the rule of law, notwithstanding his deep and abiding commitment
to nonviolent resistance of unjust laws.
5. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON JR.
AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS (1993) [hereinafter BASS, TAMING THE STORM]; JACK
BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 19, 78-82, 331 (1981) [hereinafter BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES]; TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ALABAMA (1981).




I. JOHN S. STONE: A BAR LEADER COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW
Before moving into the substance of this lecture, please allow me first
to thank publicly Dean Ken Randall and The University of Alabama School
of Law faculty for appointing me to the John S. Stone Chair of Law. It is a
tremendous professional honor to hold this prestigious title. Moreover, it is
also a deep honor to hold a chair named for a leading member of the bar, a
lawyer committed to promoting the highest standards of ethics and profes-
sionalism, who worked to promote law reform and the efficient administra-
tion of justice, and who, like Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr., was deeply
committed to securing the rule of law.'
At a time of increasing economic uncertainty and dislocation, the im-
portance of philanthropy to the success of higher education, including legal
education, cannot be overstated. To put the matter simply, but for the
Stone family's and its friends' support of The University of Alabama
School of Law, none of us would be here this afternoon. Philanthropy of
this sort is essential to the continued growth and success of both the School
of Law and The University of Alabama more generally. Accordingly, I
wish to publicly thank the Stone family and their friends for choosing to
establish and endow the position that I now hold.
John Stone was an active and engaged member of the Alabama Bar,
practicing corporate law in Birmingham and representing a diverse group
of clients, including several major railroad companies.8 Mr. Stone was a
leader of the state and local bar and worked vigorously to advance the pro-
ject of law reform; he was critically concerned with the fair and efficient
administration of justice in Alabama.' Indeed, based on his professional
activities and service to the bar, it is clear beyond peradventure that Mr.
Stone was devoted to securing the rule of law in Alabama.'o In this impor-
tant sense, he shared a commitment with Judge Frank M. Johnson
7. See Editorial, Citizen John Stone: An Apostle of Decency, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 29, 1932,
at 8 (noting that attorney Stone "demanded clean practice and thoroughgoing decency in the profes-
sion," lauding Stone's efforts "to rid the local bar of members engaged in unethical practice," and
predicting that "[h]is efforts fearlessly to set the legal house in order will be remembered beyond this
generation"); Obituary, John S. Stone, BIRMINGHAM AGE-HERALD, July 30, 1932, at 4 (noting that
Stone "struggled heroically to modernize procedure in the courts and to make justice at once alert and
humane"); Editorial, Alabama Loses a Leader, BIRMINGHAM POST, July 30, 1932, at 4 (noting that
"[i]n a profession where ethics are too often disregarded, Mr. Stone maintained and abided by the
highest conception of the duties of his calling," that Stone's "work for corrective measures that would
make justice as easily obtainable for the rich as for the poor and deserved punishment as certain for the
mighty as for the lowly," and observing that "[t]he efforts he exerted as president of the Birmingham
Bar Assn. toward reducing inefficiency and uncertainty in our court procedure are well known").
8. J.W. Patton, Death Takes John S. Stone, THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE EMPLOYES'
MAGAZINE, Aug. 1932, at 5.
9. Editorial, Alabama Loses a Leader, supra note 7, at 4.
10. See Editorial, Citizen John Stone, supra note 7, at 8 (observing that Stone was "by very birth
and breeding a strong and simple advocate of clean and aboveboard tactics").
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Jr.; John S. Stone, Esq., firmly believed that a justly ordered community
must be committed to securing the rule of law.
II. THE RULE OF LAW AND TROUBLED TIMES
Regardless of their positions on the ideological spectrum, virtually all
lawyers, judges, and politicians claim a deep and abiding commitment to
the rule of law." When the question is merely theoretical, a firm commit-
ment to the rule of law imposes few costs and casts the person making the
rhetorical commitment on the side of light and goodness. At the same time,
when things seem difficult, when the costs of honoring a commitment to
the rule of law seem less than negligible, our commitment to honoring its
dictates can wane considerably. To borrow Robert Bolt's excellent turn of
phrase, when "the weather turns nasty," all too often we readily "up with
an anchor and let it down where there's less wind."1 2
The traumatic events of September 11, 2001, provide a telling case in
point. In times of safety and plenty, it is easy, costless, in fact, to proclaim
a strong commitment to the rule of law and to affording all persons its pro-
tection. But, when times become difficult, this commitment can be tested.
September 11, 2001, was a day, like December 7, 1941, that will live in
infamy. Al-Qaeda's vicious attacks on innocent civilians in New York
City, New York, and Washington, D.C., will justly live on in our collec-
tive memory as exemplars of the basest sort of perfidy. Our national reac-
tion to this tragedy, however, provided an important test of our core com-
mitment to securing and advancing the rule of law. I fear, in retrospect,
that our government did not entirely pass the test.13
Some of the brightest lawyers of their generation, working in the De-
partment of Justice and the Office of Legal Counsel in the White House,
saw in the attacks of 9/11 an astoundingly broad warrant for an unprece-
dented expansion of executive authority.14 Seeking to counter an invisible
11. See Fareed Zakaria, The Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Dec. 17, 2006, at 8
(asserting that "[e]veryone accepts that 'the rule of law' is the foundation of liberties in the Western
world"). But cf. Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 353, 359
(2006) ("Although everyone agrees that the rule of law is important, its existence in a polity is a ques-
tion that tends to be answered the way U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once defined pornog-
raphy: 'I know it when I see it.'"). Kahn notes that "[w]hen definitions are offered [of the rule of law],
they are often unhelpfully conclusory and imprecise." Id.
12. See BOLT, supra note 1, at 69.
13. See Editorial, The Tortured Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A26; Neil A. Lewis,
Memos Reveal Scope of Power Bush Sought in Fighting Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at Al
(discussing memoranda providing justifications for broad, extra-constitutional presidential powers that
the President could exercise domestically in order to combat the war on terror, including the unilateral
suspension of substantial parts of both the First and Fourth Amendments of the Bill of Rights).
14. See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Terror-War Fallout Lingers Over Bush Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at Al; see also Report: Surveillance 'Unprecedented', SEATTLE TIMES, July 11,
2009, at A3 (noting that "[tihe Bush Administration built an unprecedented surveillance operation to
pull in mountains of information far beyond the warrantless wiretapping previously acknowledged" and
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enemy, our government's best legal talent concluded that the President was
free to disregard constitutional constraints, ignore the Bill of Rights, and in
the name of saving the Constitution, defile it." For example, the Depart-
ment of Justice and the White House Office of Legal Counsel both con-
cluded that domestic spying, without warrants or any judicial supervision,
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee that "the people"
were "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."16 The relevant text, drafted by James
Madison and adopted in the very first Congress, could not be more clear:
"[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.""
The Supreme Court has, of course, developed a byzantine case law that
attempts to establish that the Fourth Amendment does not really mean what
it seems so clearly to say. Leaving aside criticisms of various judicially-
engrafted warrant exceptions, the notion of a freewheeling, unsupervised
wiretap program of any telephone call initiated from a foreign nation to
someone in the United States, or to someone outside the United States from
someone here, should be shocking. It is a breathtaking claim that seems
simply to disregard a clear limitation on the scope of governmental investi-
gative power.
Liberty and security are always in tension, and if one sought absolute
security, the price to liberty would be extreme. To be sure, freedom can
be, and routinely is, abused. But the Framers of our Constitution made a
conscious decision to assume risk, significant risk, to better secure lib-
erty," and no government official, high or low-even the President-has a
unilateral right to revisit that allocation of risk.
observing that the operation rested on a dubious legal basis). Moreover, whether one could attempt
successfully to justify the unlawful (indeed, unconstitutional) means based on the ends sought to be
achieved also appears rather doubtful, at least in hindsight. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, U.S.
Wiretapping of Limited Value, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2009, at Al.
15. See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB xxv-xxxiv, 3-380 (Karen J. Green-
berg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (republishing major opinions and memoranda of the Department
of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel authorizing, among other things, unlimited executive detention of
enemy combatants and the use of "enhanced interrogation tactics" that many claimed constituted "tor-
ture" under the Geneva Convention); see also Josh Meyer & Julian Barnes, Memos Gave Bush Over-
riding Powers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at Al, A14 (discussing additional Office of Legal Counsel
memoranda released by the Obama Administration that addressed the scope of the President's powers
in the domestic context); Editorial, The Tortured Memos, supra note 13, at A26 (discussing and criti-
cizing the same memoranda).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE
PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 12-13 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/irpleprint/psp.pdf (documenting and criticizing the Bush Administration's domestic
spying program and the use of warrantless wiretaps on U.S. citizens).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 531, 535, 565 (1998) (arguing that the structural separation of powers within the federal govern-
ment makes governance more difficult, but works both to secure personal liberty and to facilitate ac-
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Yet, in the weeks and months immediately following 9/11, senior law-
yers working for the Bush Administration, ostensibly providing accurate
and credible legal advice, advocated the following propositions:
* The President, acting alone and without the consent of Congress,
may authorize warrantless wiretaps.19
* "First Amendment speech and press rights may also be subordi-
nated to the overriding need to wage war successfully." 20
* The Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements,
"however well suited" to criminal law enforcement, are simply "unsuited
to the demands of wartime and the military necessity to successfully prose-
cute a war against an enemy."21
* "In light of the well-settled understanding that constitutional con-
straints must give way in some respects to the exigencies of war, we think
that the better view is that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to domes-
tic military operations designed to deter and prevent further terrorist at-
tacks. "22
* The President has the inherent and unlimited authority to transfer
prisoners to third countries incident to extraordinary rendition, provided
that no overt and express affirmative agreement existed that a transferee
would be tortured.23
All of these propositions are remarkable for the sheer audacity of their
scope and also for their departure from the notion that the President is sub-
ject to the rule of law.24
countability for government actions); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1513-17, 1531-40 (1991) (arguing that the separation of powers exists primarily
not to protect the branches of the federal government from each other, but rather to protect citizens
against the abuse of governmental authority, even at the cost of creating a cumbersome governmental
framework that creates much inefficiency); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law,
and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301, 303-07 (1989) (arguing that separation
of powers and rule of law work together to constrain government from unwise or unjust action).
19. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to David S. Kris,
Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelligence Service Act to
Change the "Purpose" Standard for Searches 6-8 (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/docu
ments/memoforeignsurveillanceactO9252001.pdf.
20. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty,
Special Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Coun-
sel, Dep't of Def., Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United
States 24 (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus 10232001.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 25.
23. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes II, Gen'l
Counsel, Dep't of Def., The President's Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists
to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations 20, 25-26, 34-35 (Mar. 13, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memorandum03132002.pdf.
24. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1952) (holding that
even a claim of national emergency in the context of an ongoing foreign military operation in Korea
does not authorize unilateral presidential governance because the President lacks any general and inde-
pendent lawmaking power and observing that "[tihe Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking
power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times"); id. at 650 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
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A question begs to be asked and answered: How did very smart law-
yers, educated at and graduated from some of the finest law schools in the
nation, find it possible to endorse a set of conclusions that, at bottom, rest
on the notion that in times of war or crisis, the President is a law unto him-
self? Even if in contemporary context in late 2001 and early 2002, the
costs of constitutional fealty seemed potentially very high, the Constitution
itself simply does not authorize presidential dictatorship. To put the matter
both simply and directly, lawyers vested with advising the President on the
requirements of the Constitution and laws failed to discharge their duties to
the President, the nation, and the profession.
A related question arises from the public attacks on lawyers represent-
ing detainees at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Assistant
Secretary of Defense Charles "Cully" Stimson, in March 2007, called on
corporations to boycott law firms if a firm provided pro bono legal assis-
tance to the detainees. Moreover, a major presidential candidate publicly
celebrated the Guantanamo detention facility, arguing that rather than clos-
ing it the United States should "double Guantanamo," 26 and helpfully
that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution "knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they
engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation" and
concluding that "(w]e may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies"); Verkuil, supra note 18, at 317-18 (arguing that the President cannot enact legislative
policies without the consent of Congress and noting that when "the President seeks to preempt the
legislative branch," such action "rais[es] the warning signs of executive hegemony that triggered the
Glorious Revolution and its American counterpart").
Notwithstanding the public firestorm associated with these policies, however, at least some of
the Bush Administration lawyers responsible for them apparently remain utterly unapologetic and
unrepentant about their legal advice to the President and the Attorney General. See John Yoo, Why We
Endorsed Warrantless Wiretaps, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at A13. Professor Yoo's defense largely
boils down to unsupported claims such as "[ojur Constitution created a presidency whose function is to
protect the nation from attack," the more specific suggestion that "[i]n FISA, President Bush and his
advisers faced an obsolete law not written with live war with an international terrorist organization in
mind," and the counterfactual (and hyperbolic) conclusion that "[it is absurd to think that a law like
FISA should restrict live military operations against potential attacks on the United States." Id.
With all due respect to Professor Yoo, the President is neither a king nor a dictator, and nei-
ther the President nor his aides may pick and choose which laws that they will deign to observe and
which laws that they will elect to ignore. If Professor Yoo needs to conduct some supplementary read-
ing on this question, he might take a gander at United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (holding
that the President, like all citizens, must comply with lawful discovery requests incident to the adjudica-
tion of criminal charges against a U.S. citizen). To state the matter simply, the existence of a war does
not transform the President into an extraconstitutional monarch; he (or she) remains obliged to "faith-
fully execute" all the laws enacted by Congress (as opposed to only congenial laws) and to respect
constitutional limitations on executive authority (such as, for example, the Fourth Amendment). See
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89.
25. See Editorial, Guantanamo Intimidation: lawyers for Terrorism Suspects are Still Being Bul-
lied, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2007, at A18; Pentagon Official Who Criticized Detainee Lawyer Quits,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at A6.
26. Contemporary media coverage of a 2007 GOP primary debate noted that:
Former Gov. Mitt Romney of Massachusetts said he would support "not torture but en-
hanced interrogation techniques." And taking a tougher line than President Bush and Mr.
McCain, who have said they would like to shut down the detention center at Guantinamo
Bay, Mr. Romney said he wanted the facility doubled in size.
172
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added that keeping the detainees in Cuba facilitated denial of both formal
legal processes and access to lawyers.27
To be clear, I harbor no doubts about the reality of the threat of terror-
ism or the ill-will that some bear the United States and its citizens; the les-
sons of 9/11 cannot be ignored. Even so, however, it should be shocking
for a major presidential candidate to openly advocate indefinite executive
detention of persons without access either to lawyers or courts. This sort of
unlimited executive power was one of the root causes of the American
Revolution in 1776.28 Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution believed that
delineating and limiting the scope of government power was essential to
preventing "tyranny." 29 And the Framers' fear was not of foreign invaders
or domestic saboteurs, but rather of government officials, drunk with
power, using that power to remain in office for as long as feasible and by
any means necessary."o
In this regard, the American Bar Association's strong stand in favor of
affording even those accused of the vilest crimes access to lawyers and the
Article III courts merits both notice and praise." The ABA House of Dele-
Adam Nagourney & Marc Santora, Terror Attack Scenario Exposes Deep Differences Among G.O.P.
Hopefuls, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at A17; see also Marc Santora, 3 Top Republican Candidates
Take a Hard Line on the Interrogation of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at A17 (describing
enthusiasm of several Republican would-be presidential nominees for "enhanced interrogation" tech-
niques and noting specifically that Mitt Romney, after visiting the detainee facility in Cuba, was quoted
as having "no concerns with regards to the fair and appropriate treating of these individuals" and also
reporting that Mr. Romney wished to "double GuantAnano").
27. See Paul Krugman, Don't Blame Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2007, at A25 (noting that at a
Republican presidential candidate debate, "the candidates spoke enthusiastically in favor of torture and
against the rule of law. Rudy Giuliani endorsed waterboarding. Mitt Romney declared that he wants
accused terrorists at Guantinamo, 'where they don't get the access to lawyers they get when they're on
our soil. . . . My view is, we ought to double Guantdnamo.' His remarks were greeted with wild ap-
plause"); cf. James Podgers, ABA Endorses Detainee Rights, ABA J., Mar. 2009, at 66 ("The ABA's
policymaking House of Delegates voted overwhelmingly at the midyear meeting to endorse rights of
due process for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.").
28. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-56 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Framers sought to prevent unilateral deprivations of liberty at the hand of executive authorities,
quoting Blackstone on the centrality of this principle in a justly ordered society, and noting that "[tihe
gist of the Due Process Clause, as understood at the founding and since, was to force the Government
to follow those common-law procedures traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of
life, liberty, or property"); id. at 554-55 ("The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon sys-
tem of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.").
29. See Brown, Separated Powers, supra note 18, at 1513-16.
30. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DuKE L.J. 449, 450-51 (1991).
31. See Podgers, supra note 27, at 66. In fact, the ABA expressed misgivings about abuses associ-
ated with the Bush Administration's efforts to prosecute the War on Terror even earlier, in 2004. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Aug. 9, 2004, reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 1132-64. The ABA adopted the report at its 2004 annual meeting;
the resolution and report, among other things, "condemns any use of torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment upon persons within the custody or under the physical control of the
United States government (including its contractors) and any endorsement or authorization of such
measures by government lawyers, officials and agents." Id. at 1132.
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gates has approved a resolution expressly calling for the Guantanamo de-
tainees to have access to lawyers, to the Article III federal courts, and to
legislative limitations on indefinite confinement of persons established to be
enemy combatants after full and fair hearings.32
III. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE JUDICIAL CRAFT
Without in any way attempting to lessen or minimize the importance of
9/11, the United States has faced other crises and not found it necessary to
suspend the Constitution in order to meet the exigencies of the day. A tell-
ing case in point involves efforts to enforce the constitutional guarantees of
equal protection of the laws in the states of the former Confederacy. Mili-
tant and widespread opposition to the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown,33
so-called "massive resistance," 3 4 made efforts to translate the decision into
a lived reality a daunting task, particularly for the lower federal court
judges in the South faced with crafting orders to desegregate the public
schools, universities, parks, and libraries.
Opposition to the implementation of Brown enjoyed the support of
many white Southerners, and politicians throughout the South took heed of
this fact. As Professor Spivack notes, "an overall segregationist strategy
was developed to avoid, or at least postpone, the effect of the Brown deci-
sion." 36 This plan of action included a number of discrete steps, including
"mobilization of political power to discourage school boards and judges
from proceeding against segregation," "creation of obstacles to make it
difficult for blacks to take desegregation suits before judges," "persuasion
of southern federal judges not to issue desegregation orders through legal
argument" and "circumvention of those orders which were issued," en-
couraging both school boards and school administrators to adopt the posi-
tion "that they had no obligation to desegregate or cooperate with judges in
any way," and last but not least, "attacking the Supreme Court, its deci-
sions, and its personnel.""
32. See Podgers, supra note 27, at 66.
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. JOHN M. SPIVACK, RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 46-48 (1990). As Spivack explains: "Separation of the races was to be
defended by a campaign of 'massive resistance.' The entire South would use all steps short of violence
or secession to oppose desegregation of the schools." Id. at 46.
35. See BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 5, at 9-10, 213-30, 297-318.
36. SPIVACK, supra note 34, at 47.
37. Id. at 47-48. For an example of "moderate" contemporary Southern views on the question of
voluntary desegregation of the public schools and other public institutions, such as colleges and univer-




These concerted efforts at defying the mandate of the Supreme Court
of the United States made life very difficult for the lower federal court
judges charged with the responsibility of translating the majestic generali-
ties of Brown and Brown II" into concrete social changes on the ground in
the hundreds of segregated school districts operating in the South. As the
historian Jack Bass has eloquently stated the matter, "Operating in the eye
of a storm, they made the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the institutional
equivalent of the Civil Rights Movement itself.""" Professor Owen Fiss
states the matter in even more epic terms: "It was not reasonable to expect
the judges to be heroes, but the truth of the matter is that many lived up to
these unreasonable expectations-they fought the popular pressures at great
personal sacrifice and discomfort."40
On the Fifth Circuit, "The Four," as a judicial colleague pejoratively
labeled them, worked assiduously to implement Brown, sometimes with the
cooperation of district court judges, but as often as not, without; Judges
John R. Brown, Richard T. Rives, Elbert P. Tuttle, and John Minor Wis-
dom did as much as any jurists in the nation to disestablish state-sponsored
racial discrimination in the states of the former Confederacy.41 In addition,
however, district court judges like Frank M. Johnson, Jr. and J. Skelly
Wright labored mightily on the front lines of the federal judiciary to im-
plement the fundamental constitutional principles of Brown.42 Professor
Bass notes, quite accurately, that "[b]efore their elevation as circuit judges,
the roles of District Judge Johnson for more than two decades in Alabama
and District Judge J. Skelly Wright for a much shorter period in New Or-
leans demonstrated the creative force of a single district judge." 43 More-
over, "[t]heir interaction with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals intensified
that court's lasting historical impact.""
38. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (calling for the admission of would-be
students to the public schools on a "nonracial basis" and for the operation of the public schools on a
"racially nondiscriminatory" basis going forward and instructing the lower federal courts to require that
"the defendants [local public school districts] make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compli-
ance with our May 17, 1954, ruling [in Brown 1]").
39. JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 9 (1990).
40. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 90 (1978).
41. See BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 5, at 15-19, 23-26; see also SPIVACK, supra note
34, at 52 (observing that "[tihe federal courts were thus entrusted with the primary responsibility for
desegregation in southern public schools" and also that federal courts in the South "were staffed and
operated in an atmosphere that was bitterly hostile to the law the judges were bound to enforce"); id. at
169-72 (discussing the crucial contributions made by these four judges to operationalizing Brown and
asking "what might have happened in the South if there had been a different cast of characters on the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals[?]").
42. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 5, at 19, 56-58, 66-68, 112-16.




Given his clear and steadfast determination to implement Brown over
many years,45 one might casually assume that Judge Frank Johnson's per-
sonal sympathies were with the leadership of the Civil Rights Movement.
Such an assumption would undoubtedly be correct, but this does not mean
that Judge Johnson would excuse unlawful actions undertaken in the ser-
vice of the cause. Many are familiar with Judge Johnson's famous decision
in Williams v. Wallace,' in which he held that, in light of the horrific and
longstanding constitutional wrongs committed against African-American
citizens of Alabama, the state of Alabama had a duty to facilitate a mass
march from Selma to Montgomery over U.S. Highway 80, the main arte-
rial road in the region.
In issuing the injunction permitting the march to proceed, Judge John-
son explained that "it seems basic to our constitutional principles that the
extent of the right to assemble, demonstrate and march peaceably along the
highways and streets in an orderly manner should be commensurate with the
enormity of the wrongs that are being protested and petitioned against."47
With respect to the denial of voting rights in Alabama, the subject of the
protest march, "the wrongs are enormous," and "[t]he extent of the right to
demonstrate against these wrongs should be determined accordingly."48
At a superficial level of analysis, one could read the opinion in Wil-
liams as reflecting broad sympathy for both the protestors and their cause;
to some extent, such a reading would be warranted. For example, former
U.S. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach wrote contemporaneously of
the decision that "frankly, I question that rule [Judge Johnson's 'propor-
tionality principle'] as a practical measure of the applicability of the first
amendment."49 To be sure, Williams was a very bold decision-creatively
reasoned and creatively implemented; Judge Johnson fashioned a remedy
appropriate to the events of March 7, 1965, when civil rights protestors
were brutally attacked by Alabama state troopers after crossing the Ed-
mund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama.o
45. See BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 5, at 118-273; BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra
note 5, at 78-83, 259-77.
46. 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
47. Id. at 106.
48. Id. For a general discussion and defense of Judge Johnson's proportionality principle in afford-
ing access to government property for speech activity, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating
Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411 (1995).
49. Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Protest, Politics and the First Amendment, 44 TUL. L. REV. 439,
445 (1970).
50. For an account of the Selma March and the failed precursor march of March 7, 1965, see
DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 370-413 (1986) [hereinafter GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS]; DAVID J.
GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
72-89, 115-19 (1978) [hereinafter GARRow, PROTEST AT SELMA]; see also BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES,
supra note 5, at 249-52.
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A largely forgotten part of this story, however, was Dr. Martin Luther
King's intent to violate an injunction against proceeding with a march from
Selma to Montgomery during the pendency of court proceedings before
Judge Johnson. On Monday, March 8, 1965, lawyers representing the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) sought an injunction
against further state interference with the planned protest march in the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, with an eye toward a
second attempt at marching from Selma to Montgomery on Tuesday,
March 9, 1965." In fact, Dr. King announced on national television that
the march would proceed again on Tuesday, March 9, 1965.52 Judge John-
son, however, had other ideas.
Judge Johnson told the SCLC's lead lawyer, the legendary Fred
Gray, that he would not issue an injunction for a second march without a
hearing and that he would enjoin the SCLC, including Dr. King, from pro-
ceeding during the pendency of the court proceedings; Judge Johnson
sought a response from Dr. King and the SCLC not later than 9:00 PM on
Monday, March 8, 1965.54 Dr. King, having already announced that a sec-
ond attempted march would take place on March 9, 1965, was reticent to
stand down." Ultimately, Judge Johnson issued a restraining order prohib-
iting any attempt to conduct the march prior to the scheduled hearing; if
Dr. King violated the order, he risked being held in contempt of court.56
Wisely, Dr. King decided not to test Judge Johnson's resolve in the
matter. Although Dr. King led a march on March 9, 1965, from downtown
Selma to the Edmund Pettus Bridge, and across it, he made no effort to
proceed beyond a police line on the east bank of the river; instead, after
crossing the bridge, Dr. King turned back to downtown Selma.57 In short,
51. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 50, at 76.
52. Id. at 80; see also Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 785,
787-88, 796-97 (1965) (discussing Dr. King's desire to proceed with a march notwithstanding Judge
Johnson's injunction against proceeding during the pendency of the district court's consideration of the
case).
53. Gray was a key figure in the Civil Rights Movement and actively represented civil rights liti-
gants in the state and federal courts in Alabama; in fact, he served as legal counsel to Ms. Rosa Parks
after her arrest for refusing to give up her seat on a Montgomery, Alabama city transit bus and also to
the Montgomery Improvement Association-which comprised the leaders of the Montgomery Bus Boy-
cott. See BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 5, at 97-101, 148; BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra
note 5, at 58-59, 63-64; GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 50, at 13-14, 21, 24-26, 76.
54. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 50, at 83-84.
55. See BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 5, at 239; GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS, supra
note 50, at 401-03.
56. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 50, at 86.
57. Id. at 86-87; see also Krotoszynski, supra note 48, at 1417-19 (describing the events up to and
including the brutal police attack on the civil rights marchers on March 7, 1965, and Dr. King's actions
on March 9, 1965). For Judge Johnson's own account of these events, see Frank M. Johnson, Civil
Disobedience and the Law, 44 TUL. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1969). Johnson reports that "Dr. Martin Luther
King felt that an imminent march was essential and that he considered disregarding the restraining
order." Id. at 10. Johnson notes that Dr. King did not violate the order and observes that "[tihe moral
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he did not violate Judge Johnson's order. Burke Marshall, writing contem-
poraneously about Dr. King's dilemma, notes that
Dr. King did not disobey the court order, that he acted with the
advice of lawyers, and that to the extent that there was ambiguity
in what he did, he acted in the good faith belief that the court
would find either that he had not been in contempt (as it later did),
or that the order, if it was violated by his conduct, was too broad
to be constitutionally valid."
In the end, of course, Dr. King and the SCLC did obtain an order re-
quiring Alabama to permit the march.59 On Sunday, March 21, 1965, the
march commenced from Selma, arriving in Montgomery four days later,
with 25,000 participants.' The impact of the Selma March cannot be over-
stated; the events in Selma of March 1965 had a direct causal relationship
with the introduction and passage of the landmark Voting Rights Act of
1965.
I have no doubt, whatsoever, that Judge Johnson would have held Dr.
King and the SCLC in contempt of court if they had violated his restraining
order against the proposed March 9, 1965 march. This was not because
Judge Johnson lacked sympathy for the merits of the SCLC's cause, but
rather because he could not countenance intentional violation of the law,
even by a very sympathetic contemnor.
Indeed, direct evidence of Judge Johnson's evenhanded enforcement of
the law is available. Two lesser known civil rights era protest cases dem-
onstrate quite conclusively that he held leaders of the Civil Rights Move-
ment no less accountable to the rule of law than renegade state officials.
In 1966, the situation was quite tense in Greenville, Alabama. The
SCLC had been organizing local residents to protest systemic forms of
discrimination in the community, including the denial of voting rights. The
impact of the march, which was to produce the Voting Rights Act of 1965, would have been greatly
diminished if the court order had been violated." Id.
58. Marshall, supra note 52, at 796-97.
59. Judge Johnson decided the case quickly, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on Wednesday, March
17, 1965, and issuing his formal opinion two days later, on Friday, March 19, 1965. See Williams v.
Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 100, 111 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
60. See GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA, supra note 50, 114-17.
61. See id. at 117-19; Krotoszynski, supra note 48, at 1427-28; see also Katzenbach, supra note
48, at 444 (noting that the events of Selma "helped to get the necessary legislation enacted and helped
to demonstrate to the white southerners, and particularly to the white southern officials, that the Presi-
dent had the political support of the country necessary to carry through enforcement of constitutional
principles"). But cf. Marshall, supra note 52, at 788 (rhetorically questioning the importance of the
march, asking "[w]hat national interest was served by this display?" and arguing that "[t]he immediate
results of the protest are at most ambiguous: the voting legislation which was at issue had already been
asked by President Johnson, and he and the Department of Justice and the federal government as a
whole were already doing everything in their power to deal with the underlying problems").
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local SCLC organizer, R.B. Cottonreader, Jr., brought suit against Elton
Johnson, the mayor of Greenville, Alabama, seeking an injunction against
police efforts to impede civil rights protests on the streets and sidewalks of
the city. The city, in turn, counterclaimed against the SCLC and Cotton-
reader, seeking an injunction against unlawful marches and disregard of
local traffic laws. The city refused lawful requests for parade permits and
cast a blind eye on groups of "white civilians" who "congregate[d] at or
near the place where the marching and demonstrating was taking place"
and were "armed with knives, brass knuckles, and, upon occasion,
guns."62 Judge Johnson accepted as credible testimony to the effect that the
protests and the reaction to them had created "'an explosive situation' in
Greenville.
Reaching the merits of the case, Judge Johnson granted the SCLC's re-
quest for an injunction against the city's unlawful denials of parade permits
and failure to provide adequate protection to the civil rights protestors.'
However, he also enjoined the SCLC from parading without a permit or
prior notice to local authorities, parading or demonstrating at night, disre-
garding traffic signals, and disrupting the operation of the local public
schools.6 ' As Judge Johnson stated the matter, "The fault lies on both
sides."' He expected everyone to respect the rule of law and to obey the
law, including those seeking redress of unconstitutional state action. More-
over, he was unwilling to ignore or cast a blind eye on unlawful conduct
by those seeking to advance equal civil rights for all.
Two years later, in 1968, Judge Johnson decided Houser v. Hill,67 an-
other case that involved illegal conduct by both civil rights protestors and
local government officials. The case involved a melee associated with a
rally and protest in Prattville, Alabama, that featured Stokely Carmichael.
Carmichael, at the time of the rally, was a leader of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC); 68 he went on to be a founder and leader
of the Black Panther Party, serving as its "Honorary Prime Minister. "6' At
a rally and protest meeting on the afternoon of June 11, 1967, Stokely
Carmichael spoke and invoked his famous "Black Power!" cry repeatedly
in the presence of local Prattville and Autauga County, Alabama law en-
62. Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
63. Id. at 496.
64. Id. at 496, 499.
65. See id. at 496-97, 499-500.
66. Id. at 496 (emphasis in original).
67. Houser v. Hill, 278 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
68. See GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 50, at 472-78.
69. See STOKELY CARMICHAEL, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION (1992); STOKELY




forcement officers.o After seeking reinforcements, the officers moved to
arrest Carmichael for "disorderly conduct" and held him in the county jail
for two days."
Members and supporters of SNCC regrouped and gathered at the home
of Dan Houser, in the Happy Hollow area of Prattville; Prattville city po-
lice cars patrolled the area, and witnesses reported that gunshots issued
from at least one of the police cars.n At the same time, attendees at the
meeting "armed themselves with guns, rocks and other missiles," "rocks
and bottles were thrown at automobiles, two police cars were fired on by
unknown individuals," and a sheriff and city policeman "were each
wounded to a minor extent by shotgun pellets." 73 Things quickly deterio-
rated: "From this point on, until about 2:00 a.m. on Monday, June 12,
Prattville, Alabama, literally became an armed camp."74
The protests related back, at least in part, to the shooting of Charles
Raspberry, an African-American, by Kenneth Hill, a Prattville city police
officer, incident to an alleged escape attempt from the local jail." The
shooting, which took place earlier in 1967, served as a flashpoint for racial
tensions in the community and was the genesis of the June 11, 1967 protest
rally. Perhaps predictably, it was Officer Hill who arrested Carmichael at
the June 11 rally and protest.
Judge Johnson was clearly displeased with both the protestors and the
city: "This Court unequivocally and emphatically condemns any advocacy
of violence or the use of violence at any time, and particularly in connec-
tion with activities that are ostensibly designed to secure full rights of citi-
zenship to members of the minority race."7 6 At the same time, however,
Judge Johnson "equally condemn[ed]" the "excessive use of force or
power, or any brutality, on the part of police officials." 77 Quoting his ear-
70. Houser, 278 F. Supp. at 930-31 (transcript of testimony of Nitricia Hadnott); see also id. at
935-36 (press release account of the incident issued by SNCC); id. at 937 (notes of eyewitness Sandra
Colvin). According to an eyewitness account, Carmichael said, "The only way to get Kennedy [sic]
Hill off force is to organize the black power in this area and use your guns. . . . Black power! ...
Black Power! . . . Black Power!" Id. at 937. Prattville police officer Kenneth Hill had shot Charles
Raspberry earlier in the year and members of the community wanted him removed from the local police
force. See id. at 925. When Officer Hill confronted Carmichael following these comments, Carmichael
did not back down: "You know, the only time black people are allowed to meet without interference is
to pray and to dance. Whenever black people get together for any other reasons, the hunkies get scared
and come out to beat and kill us." Id. Hill responded, "Shut up, boy cause I'm the law around here,"
whereupon Carmichael, giving no ground, told Hill, "Take off that tin badge and drop your gun. I'll
show you something, hunkie." Id. The conversation continued downhill from here; after Carmichael
said, "From now on, its going to be an eye for an eye, a toot[h] for a toot[h], and a hunkie for every
black man killed!" Id. Hill placed Carmichael under arrest. Id.
71. Id. at 924.
72. Id.




77. Id. at 926.
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lier opinion in Cottonreader, Johnson found that "the fault lies on both
sides."" He proceeded to issue an injunction against both the plaintiffs and
the defendants. With respect to SNCC, the court prohibited "[s]ponsoring
and arranging meetings and assemblies to be addressed by those who advo-
cate violence through the use of guns and other actions designed to and
tending to disrupt the peace and order of the community" and also "[u]sing
violent means to protest and demonstrate."' With respect to the local law
enforcement authorities, the court enjoined summary punishment, unlawful
interference with lawful protests and assemblies, failure to provide police
protection to the plaintiffs, false arrest, and permitting roving gangs of
"hostile white groups to gather and congregate for the purpose of commit-
ting acts of violence upon the plaintiffs and those similarly situated."'
In Houser, as in Cottonreader, it is clear that Judge Johnson is serving
as a neutral enforcer of the law and not as an advocate; he condemns and
enjoins unlawful behavior on both sides and expressly finds that "the fault
lies on both sides."81 To be sure, the African-American community in both
Greenville, Alabama, and in Prattville, Alabama, had just cause to seek
legal redress for systemic forms of discrimination and officially sanctioned
harassment and oppression. Even though the plaintiffs were the victims of
unlawful government conduct, this fact did not excuse them from comply-
ing with otherwise valid neutral laws of general applicability, including
traffic laws, laws against assault and battery, and laws against uttering
threats of violence. Thus, in Judge Johnson's view, even when a plaintiff
class has meritorious legal claims against the government, this does not
entitle the group to take the law into their own hands.
Indeed, if one looks to Judge Johnson's writings both on and off the
bench during the 1960s, one finds a jurist anxious to defend the rule of law
and the need for civil rights leaders to respect it: "Civil disobedience nec-
essarily involves violation of the law, and the law can make no provision
for its violation except to hold the offender liable for punishment."82 At the
height of the Civil Rights Movement, he explained his position at greater
length in Forman v. City of Montgomery:83
There is no immunity conferred by our Constitution and laws of
the United States to those individuals who insist upon practicing
civil disobedience under the guise of demonstrating or protesting
for "civil rights." The philosophy that a person may-if his cause
is labeled "civil rights" or "states rights"-determine for himself
78. Id. (quoting Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1966)).
79. Id. at 927, 929.
80. Id. at 928-29.
81. Id. at 926.
82. Johnson, supra note 57, at 3.
83. 245 F. Supp. 17 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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what laws and court decisions are morally right or wrong, and ei-
ther obey or refuse to obey them according to his own determina-
tion, is a philosophy that is foreign to our "rule-of-law" theory of
government. '
Judge Johnson also specifically denounced violence in the name of social
change: "There is no legal or moral justification for the rioting, burning,
looting and killing that have occurred in such cities as Los Angeles, De-
troit, Chicago, Newark, Kansas City and Washington. Understandable,
perhaps; justifiable, never.""
Judges, lawyers, and citizens all have a duty to respect the rule of law:
"It is the duty and unique responsibility of every fair-minded citizen to
recognize and follow the proposition that respect for law is the most fun-
damental of all social virtues, for the alternative to the rule of law is vio-
lence and anarchy."86 This holds true "whether the individual agrees or
not"" with the law because "[n]o system can endure where each citizen is
free to choose which law he will obey."" Echoing the language of the
playwright Robert Bolt in A Man for All Seasons, Judge Johnson concludes
that "[o]bedience to the laws we like and defiance of those we dislike is the
route to chaos." 89
Insofar as civil disobedience "involves violation of the law, . . . the law
can make no provision for its violation except to hold the offender liable
for punishment."' Thus, "[iut would be a mistake to conclude here that
civil disobedience is justified provided only that it is disobedience in the
name of high principles."91 Issuing a warning that it appears the Bush Ad-
ministration failed to heed in its pursuit of Al-Qaeda terrorists post 9/11,92
Judge Johnson admonishes that "[s]trong moral conviction is not all that is
required to turn breaking the law into a service that benefits society."9 In
the end, "Respect for law is the most fundamental of all social virtues, for
the alternative to the rule of law is violence and anarchy."94
84. Id. at 24.
85. Johnson, supra note 57, at 5; see also Marshall, supra note 52, at 799 ("The point is only that
governmental authority cannot act upon a general policy of sanctioning lawless behavior disruptive of
the rights of other citizens because of sympathy with the motives of the protesting group.").
86. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civil Disobedience and the Law, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 267, 271 (1968);
see also Letter from a Binningham Jail, supra note 6, at 90 ("In no sense do I advocate evading or
defying the law. ... This would lead to anarchy.").
87. Johnson, supra note 86, at 271.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 275 (emphasis in original).
91. Id.
92. See supra text and accompanying notes 13 to 27.
93. Johnson, supra note 86, at 275.
94. Id. at 271.
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Finally, judges should not labor alone in maintaining the rule of law
and the supremacy of law. Judge Johnson strongly believed that members
of the bar had a professional obligation to defend the judiciary's labors-
"the attorney must consistently uphold the supremacy of law."" "There-
fore, as a part of his duty to maintain the supremacy of the law, the lawyer
owes an obligation to the courts, if not to the individual judges, to cease
irresponsible criticism and substitute a program of constructive analysis
and elucidation."96 Lawyers have a special duty to work to foster respect
for the rule of law, but also have a self-interest in supporting the principle:
"The lawyer should remember that the man who defies or flouts the law is
like the proverbial fool who saws away the plank on which he sits, and that
a disrespect or disregard for law is always the first sign of a disintegrating
society."'
IV. THE PROMISE OF THE RULE OF LAW: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR LEGAL
WRONGS
If Judge Johnson's conception of the rule of law could make no excep-
tion for civil disobedience, to say nothing of violence, it did hold out the
promise of meaningful relief for any person suffering a legal wrong who
invoked the protection of the federal courts. Judge Johnson's approach to
constitutional interpretation reflects his deep commitment to securing equal
justice under law.
Judge Johnson believed that "[t]he Constitution is not an inert and life-
less body of law from which legal consequences automatically flow." 98
Instead, the Constitution "is dynamic and living, requiring constant reeex-
amination and reevaluation." 9 For Johnson, then, "[t]he true strength of
the Constitution lies in its flexibility, its ability to change, to grow, and to
respond to the special needs and demands of our society at a particular
time."'"0 The Constitution "must be read actively" because "[i]ts broad and
general terms do not lend themselves to a single, strict construction."o101
Even though Judge Johnson endorsed a dynamic approach to constitu-
tional interpretation, it bears noting that he most emphatically did not
equate the Constitution with his own, or any individual judge's, personal
95. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Attorney and the Supremacy of Law, 1 GA. L. REV. 38, 39 (1966).
96. Id. at 40.
97. Id. at 42.
98. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of Gov-
ernment, 11 GA. L. REV. 455, 468 (1977).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901, 905 (1979); see
also sTEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 117-20
(2005) (discussing the duty of judges to interpret and apply constitutional values in ways that ensure
relevancy of moral and political commitments enshrined in the document itself).
2009] 183
Alabama Law Review
moral preferences." He characterized this understanding of judicial review
as a "misleading fallacy."103 Instead, "[taking into account the language of
the [Constitution], the intent of the framers, and the logic of prior cases,
the judge must attempt to state the essence of the constitutional guar-
anty. ""4 Judge Johnson recognized that many questions of constitutional
law will be susceptible to competing answers: "There will always be sev-
eral possible formulations. "os The key point here is that the imprecision
that exists in interpreting constitutional text is not a license for simply writ-
ing one's own personal morality into the document-the judicial task re-
quires that a judge subordinate her own moral code in order to uphold and
enforce the Constitution's political morality."
Judge Johnson emphatically rejected a model of judicial review in
which constitutional rights exist without effective legal remedies; such an
approach would fatally undermine efforts to secure the rule of law. In con-
sequence, when faced with recalcitrant state officials unable, or unwilling,
to remediate unconstitutional conditions in the Alabama state prisons and
mental hospitals, Judge Johnson deployed the equitable powers of a district
court judge creatively and aggressively to provide a meaningful remedy to
the plaintiff classes. As he explained, "[i]f we, as judges, have learned
anything from Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny, it is that pro-
hibitory relief alone affords but a hollow protection to the basic and fun-
damental rights of citizens to equal protection of the law."" Accordingly,
"when a state fails to meet constitutionally mandated requirements, it is the
solemn duty of the courts to assure compliance with the Constitution.""os
For Judge Johnson, these duties included overseeing the desegregation
of a wide variety of facilities and institutions in Alabama, including public
schools, colleges and universities, jails, parks, municipal transit systems,
airport and bus terminals, public libraries, and museums.'" With respect to
102. See Johnson, supra note 101, at 907 ("A second and more misleading fallacy is that judicial
decision-making is elitist-reflecting no more than the judge's personal view of right and wrong. I
reject that contention, whether stated in its simple or sophisticated form.").
103. Id.
104. Id. at 909. Justice Breyer has endorsed this description of the judicial task:
Moreover, to consider consequences is not to consider simply whether the consequences of a
proposed decision are good or bad, in a particular judge's opinion. Rather, to emphasize
consequences is to emphasize consequences related to the particular textual provision at is-
sue. The judge must examine the consequences through the lens of the relevant constitutional
value or purpose. The relevant values limit interpretive possibilities.
BREYER, supra note 101, at 120.
105. Johnson, supra note 101, at 909.
106. See id. ("But it is one thing for a judge to adopt a theory of political morality because it is his
own; it is another for him to exercise his judgment about what the political morality implied by the
Constitution is.").
107. Johnson, supra note 98, at 471.
108. Frank M. Johnson Jr., Observation: The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 903, 915 (1976).
109. See id. at 905-06, 905 nn. 12-18.
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unconstitutional conditions in the state prisons and mental hospitals, Judge
Johnson found that simply ordering the remediation of the unconstitutional
conditions was ineffective because the state government failed to imple-
ment any serious program of reform.no
As Professor Barry Friedman has observed, "Johnson saw himself as
filling a vacuum in leadership" because of "the 'Alabama Punting Syn-
drome,' in which state officials became the subject of judicial decrees only
because of their unwillingness to take responsibility upon themselves.""'
As Judge Johnson stated the matter, "As long as those state officials en-
trusted with the responsibility for fair and equitable governance completely
disregard that responsibility, the judiciary must and will stand ready to
intervene on behalf of the deprived."' 12
One can thus see the complementarity of Judge Johnson's judicial phi-
losophy: citizens have a general obligation to obey the law, but when the
government fails to meet its constitutional responsibilities, the federal
courts must stand ready to provide prompt and effective remedies. "[A]
judge cannot discharge his oath of office without seeing to it that relief is
provided.""' The availability of effective relief from the federal courts,
under the Constitution, should moot the need for acts of civil disobedience.
Moreover, the rule of law requires that those with legitimate grievances
against the government use the courts, rather than self-help or acts of vio-
lence, to seek satisfaction.
Judge Johnson also believed that the legal system, in order to serve the
ends of justice, had to be both open and accessible to average citizens. As
he put the matter, "Access is the byword for the possibility of translating
public expression into legal action."" 4 Such access is a part of the bargain
that a citizen receives for agreeing to seek judicial assistance rather than
self-help in remediating unfair or unjust government action; it constitutes
"the steam whistle on society's teapot."115 Thus, "[t]he promise of access
which underlies the American legal system is just as important as the sub-
110. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); James v. Wallace & Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part, Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781 (1978). For a discussion of these cases and the conditions that existed in these state
facilities prior to federal court intervention, see Johnson, supra note 108, at 906-14. On the use of
structural injunctions to remediate pervasive constitutional violations in public institutions, such as
prisons and mental hospitals, see FISS, supra note 41. See also Barry Friedman, Right and Remedy, 43
VAND. L. REv. 593, 597-604 (1990).
111. Friedman, supra note 110, at 599-600.
112. Johnson, supra note 108, at 915.
113. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L.
REV. 271, 273 (1981); see also id. at 274 ("Faced with defaults by government officials, however, a
judge does not have the option of declaring that litigants have rights without remedies.").
114. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice, 41 ALA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989).
115. Id. at 3.
2009]1 185
Alabama Law Review
stantive rights which our Constitution guarantees."11 6 Although abstract
concepts such as "equality" and "justice" can "make fine subjects for
speechmaking, . . . these high-minded words may provide little comfort to
those denied a practical means for the implementation of those ideals." 117
"Access" for Judge Johnson also meant that the Constitution, and the
law more generally, should be comprehensible to average citizens without
specialized professional training. On one of my first assignments as a law
clerk, I took a simple employee benefits case arising under ERISA and
generated a forty page opinion festooned with something like 100 foot-
notes. After reading the draft, the judge called me into his chambers and
started flipping, page by page, through the draft opinion and calling out
page numbers and the running footnote count. Needless to say, I began to
have an out of body experience; how could I have so badly misjudged the
nature of the task at hand? After Judge Johnson had completed his page
and footnote count, accented with hearty laughs as the count rose on both
fronts, he became serious and stared at me: "This Court does not write for
the law reviews!"
Although I found the experience more than a little terrifying at the
time, I have come to appreciate the wisdom in Judge Johnson's approach to
judicial craftsmanship. For the rule of law to be a meaningful reality, the
law itself cannot be restricted to an isolated caste of secular priests."'
Judge Johnson has asserted that "[o]ne of the worst characteristics of
judges in particular, and the legal profession in general, is a penchant for
dull or simply incomprehensible writing, a fact decried by the likes of
Shakespeare, Swift, Bentham, and many others.""' To the extent possible,
he argued that judicial opinions should be "accessible to the layman." 20
If courts cannot produce legal opinions that a reasonably intelligent lay-
person can understand, public confidence in the judiciary will surely suffer
for it. The judiciary must endeavor, when going about its business, to re-
main connected to the citizenry who live outside the confines of the court-
116. Id. at 3-4.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Cf. Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate Over
Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 323 (1998).
119. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civilization, Integrity, and Justice: Some Observations on the Function
of the Judiciary, 43 Sw. L.J. 645, 652 (1989).
120. Id. Justice Breyer has made a very similar argument: "Still, courts, as highly trusted govern-
ment institutions, might help in various ways. Judges can explain in terms the public can understand
just what the Constitution is about." BREYER, supra note 101, at 134 (emphasis added); see also Nor-
man Dorsen, The Second Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Conservative, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249, 253
(1969) (describing Justice Harlan's commitment to writing lucid, clear opinions, which reflected his
"desire to deal with problems comprehensively and to elucidate the reasons for his judgment, so as to
leave lawyers and lower courts in no doubt about the meaning or scope of an opinion").
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house walls.12' As Judge Johnson explained, "[tihe citizenry's confidence
in justice is essential-is absolutely essential-to a government of laws."1 2 2
Judges also must possess certain characteristics, including reason, cou-
rage, and integrity: 123
Each judge sitting in this country, whether in a state or a federal
court, whether in a trial court or an appellate court, has a grave re-
sponsibility to maintain our system of ordered liberties by main-
taining supremacy of the law so that-to paraphrase Theodore Roo-
sevelt-no person is above the law and no person is below it.124
A judge "guard[s] the gate between order and anarchy" and serves as
the "preserver[ ] of our system of ordered liberties."125 In approaching her
work, "[a] judge must always be consumed by a passion for justice which
propels judgment toward the just conclusion."l 26 One should take care to
note, however, that for Judge Johnson, the "just conclusion" was never
necessarily the conclusion that he personally found most congenial.
Judge Johnson harbored serious doubts about the fundamental fairness
of the death penalty.127 Although he shared these views privately with his
law clerks in chambers, he did not generally publish them from the bench.
I believe that his concerns related to the skewed application of the death
penalty against poor and minority defendants; the machinery of death does
not choose its subjects randomly. Thus, in McCleskey,128 Judge Johnson,
writing in dissent, found that the statistical disparities in prosecutor charg-
ing decisions and jury convictions of the death penalty gave rise to a cogni-
121. In this respect, I am reminded of Ronald Dworkin's argument that the public generally reposes
greater faith and confidence in the judiciary than in the political branches of government precisely
because judges must give reasons for their decisions, and to be credible, these reasons must at least
appear to be principled. See Ronald Dworkin, The Secular Papacy, in JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACY: AN INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION 67, 75-79, 104-06 (Robert Badinter & Stephen
Breyer eds., 2004); see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 383-403 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey eds., 1994) (considering the importance of reason giving to principled decision making and its
relationship to a judge reaching a legitimate resolution of a case).
122. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Dedica-
tion Ceremony of Frank M. Johnson, Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse (May 22,
1992), in 989 F.2d at CX.
123. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Reflections on the Judicial Career of Robert S. Vance, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 964, 966-69 (1991).
124. Id. at 965-66.
125. Id. at 965.
126. Id. at 970.
127. For on-the-record comments on this topic by Judge Johnson, see BASS, TAMING THE STORM,
supra note 5, at 448-55.
128. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987);
see also BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 5, at 448-55 (discussing Judge Johnson's legal and
moral views of the death penalty).
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zable Eighth Amendment violation.'29 The Supreme Court, of course, like
the Eleventh Circuit as a whole,"'o saw the matter differently and was not
moved by the Baldus Study's statistical findings."'
Even though Judge Johnson personally opposed capital punishment,'32
so long as binding precedent from the Supreme Court held the practice to
be constitutional, he would uphold capital sentences if the product of con-
stitutionally adequate proceedings. As he explained, "I do not believe it's
proper for an Appellate Court Judge in the federal system to take that posi-
tion [holding the death penalty unconstitutional on Eighth Amendment
grounds] since the established law in the United States holds contrary. . ..
I feel obligated, as long as I stay a federal judge, to follow the law."' 33 In
this sense, then, a judge, like the average citizen, has a duty to the law that
transcends her personal moral beliefs and convictions.134
If judges in a hierarchal system have a duty to follow the law, even
when doing so proves disagreeable, judges must labor free and clear of
political or social pressures and decide cases as they come; Judge Johnson
was a vigorous defender of the absolute necessity of an independent judici-
ary. He believed that "[t]he basic strength of the federal judiciary has
been-and continues to be-its independence from political or social pres-
sures, its ability to rise above the influence of popular clamor."' 3  And, in
describing his own aspirations as a federal judge, Judge Johnson observed
that "[diuring my thirty-seven years as a federal judge, my only aspiration
has been, and will continue to be, to remove myself from the passion of the
129. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 908-09 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Judge Johnson argued that the
Baldus Study was sufficient evidence to establish an Eighth Amendment violation because "the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the racially discriminatory application of the death penalty and McCleskey does
not have to prove intent to discriminate in order to show that the death penalty is being applied arbitrar-
ily and capriciously." Id. at 908.
130. Id. at 886-87 ("[W]e affirm the district court on the ground that, assuming the validity of the
research [the Baldus Study], it would not support a decision that the Georgia law was being unconstitu-
tionally applied, much less would it compel such a finding"); id. at 891 (rejecting Eighth Amendment
claim because "[a] successful Eighth Amendment challenge would require proof that the race factor
was operating in the system in such a pervasive manner that it could fairly be said that the system was
irrational, arbitrary and capricious").
131. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-99 (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment claim); id. at
306-08 (rejecting Eighth Amendment claim).
132. As he put the matter in an interview with biographer Jack Bass, "If I was making the law, I'd
rule and hold-and I think there's a valid, a very valid legal basis for it-that the death penalty laws
violate the Eighth Amendment." BASS, TAMING THE STORM, supra note 5, at 448.
133. Id. at 449.
134. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 40 ("The judge must, regardless of the temptation, remain
objective and detached."); see also Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, Civil Liberties, and the
Warren Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 81, 103, 106 (1991) (noting Justice Harlan's regular practice
of "follow[ing] a case from which he had dissented when it was initially decided" as part of a larger
commitment to securing rule of law values associated with Legal Process Theory).
135. Johnson, supra note 98, at 474-75.
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moment in order to render the fairest interpretation of the law that I'm ca-
pable of."136
CONCLUSION
MORE: Will, I'd trust you with my life. But not your principles.
(They mount the stairs) You see, we speak of being anchored to
our principles. But if the weather turns nasty, you up with an an-
chor and let it down where there's less wind, and the fishing's bet-
ter. And "Look," we say, "look, I'm anchored!" (Laughing, invit-
ing ROPER to laugh with him) "To my principles!""'
Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. was more securely fixed to his principles
than most of us; his commitment to securing the rule of law during one of
the most troubled periods of our recent national history provides an object
lesson in the transformative potential of the law as an agent of progressive
social change. As we think about the challenges of the current economic
crisis, and the continuing sense of dread associated with a seemingly end-
less war on terror, we should take heart from the fact that the nation has
faced grave challenges in the past and risen to the occasion, successfully
meeting them and moving forward renewed and transformed.
We should be sober and clear eyed about what a meaningful commit-
ment to the rule of law implies for all of us as lawyers: it means working
to ensure fundamentally fair judicial processes, regardless of how popular,
or despised, the particular litigants happen to be. This contemporary de-
scription of life for lawyers representing civil rights litigants in the Deep
South during the 1960s is illustrative of the potential stakes:
Consider the risk the white lawyer in Alabama or in Mississippi
would take by representing Negroes or other workers in civil rights
cases or by speaking out for civil rights causes. If he does so, his
action is certain to be followed by the loss of his clients and other
economic sanctions. He will see old friends turning against him.
He may soon find himself and his family the subject of persecution
by the police. They may become the target for bombings and other
forms of violence. He and his family may well have to dig up
stakes and leave the community entirely. In my own experience,
when I have called upon lawyers in Alabama, in Mississippi, in
Louisiana, in South Carolina, and elsewhere in the South, I have
found them willing, even anxious, to help, but it has had to be be-
hind the scenes. Concern for themselves, but more often fear for
136. Johnson, supra note 122, at CXI.
137. BOLT, supra note 1, at 69.
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their families, drove them to insist that their participation be kept
confidential."I
These are not mere predictions about the consequences of public sup-
port for the Civil Rights Movement, but rather descriptions of past events.
Indeed, Judge Johnson himself faced persistent death threats, and the Ku
Klux Klan bombed his mother's house (mistakenly believing it to be Judge
Johnson's residence).' 3 9 Although, as Judge Johnson once said, "[i]t's hard
to ostracize a fellow who does his own ostracizing,"' 4 0 this did not stop
either the general community, or Governor George C. Wallace in particu-
lar, from making concerted efforts to let Judge Johnson know precisely
how deeply they despised him and his efforts to enforce constitutional
rights in Alabama.' 4'
In the teeth of these threats and catcalls, and at a great cost to himself
and his family, Judge Johnson did not waver, he did not look back, and he
did not falter in his duty to see that the rule of law prevailed. As he once
explained, "You don't make decisions on the basis of public acceptance;"
instead, "[a] judge must decide cases on the basis of fact and on the basis
of applicable law."' 42 These admonitions should apply to the lawyers advis-
ing the Attorney General or the President with no less force; if the rule of
law is to prevail, we cannot as a society vest federal judges with sole re-
sponsibility for its protection. Instead, attorneys have a particular duty to
work to explain and defend the rule of law, even when doing so is not
popular with our clients (even when that client is the President or the At-
torney General) or with our fellow citizens. When we reflect on our pro-
fession's response to 9/11, we should consider carefully whether individu-
ally and collectively we faithfully discharged our obligations to our profes-
sion, to the Constitution, and to the rule of law itself.
Judge Johnson called on all of us to work to secure the rule of law, but
he had particularly high expectations of lawyers; he viewed lawyers as full
partners with the judiciary in working to secure the rule of law. As Judge
Johnson so wisely stated the matter, "[1]awyers, therefore, face a special
138. Bernard Segal, Comments at the 1966 Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Judicial Circuit (Sept. 6, 1966), in 42 F.R.D. at 441, 447-48.
139. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES, supra note 5, at 79.
140. Id. at 80.
141. Id. at 80-82. Governor Wallace famously suggested that "a vote for George Wallace might
give a political barbed-wire enema to some federal judges," in an obvious reference to Judge Johnson.
Lawrence Wright, Atticus Finch Goes to Washington, NEW TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1977, 31, 35. In addition,
Wallace applied other equally colorful epithets to Judge Johnson, including denominating him "a low-
down, carpetbaggin', scalawaggin', race-mixin' liar." Id. at 39. Notwithstanding Judge Johnson's
steadfast determination not to engage Wallace publicly or to acknowledge the various public slights-
and threats-inflicted not only on him, but also on his wife, Ruth, and son, Johnny, these targeted
efforts at harassment must have exacted a toll. See id. As a friend of Judge Johnson stated the matter,
"[olne thing that people don't understand is the sadness and sorrow Frank has had to bear." Id.
142. Wright, supra note 142, at 33.
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challenge in this period of emotionalism: to fulfill the finest traditions of
their profession by directing their efforts in support of the continuing strug-
gle to maintain the rule of law." 1 43 It is not always easy to tell a client
something that she does not want to hear; it is undoubtedly doubly so when
the client also happens to be the President of the United States. But, if our
system of justice is to retain the confidence of the citizenry, and if the rule
of law is to prevail, lawyers have a special obligation not to cut down the
laws to get at the devil," where ever, and however, the devil has ap-
peared.
Judge Johnson's passionate commitment to respecting, promoting, and
securing the rule of law provides an important lesson to us today, one that
should have been heeded in those frightening days in the immediate after-
math of 9/11. Let us hope that, over the run of time, we as a profession
rise to the challenge that Judge Johnson's example calls us to meet.
143. Johnson, supra note 57, at 13.
144. BOLT, supra note 1, at 66.
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